In the closing years of the 20th Century identity has emerged as a leading issue for humanity, especially what is seen as the fundamental conflict between one’s identity as a member of an ethnic/national community and a growing awareness of one’s membership in a world community. What does this primary conflict mean when an individual’s identity has been formed at the interface of cultures, when someone has had an extended experience in an international, cosmopolitan environment? What special dilemmas of identity are there for internationally-experienced people?

One group in particular may hold some of the answers to these questions: Japanese returnees (kikokushija, kikokusei, or kikokusha: literally, returned-to-the-nation boys and girls, students, or people). During the past fifteen years the number of Japanese children overseas has increased dramatically, more than quadrupling according to the Ministry of Education. Nearly 100,000 of these students have returned to Japan, over 10,000 every year in recent years, and more than 50,000 are currently living abroad. Added to these students’ numbers are the hundreds of thousands of other returnees, those kikokusha adults whose extended expatriate experiences have confirmed them as special Japanese. While many returnees have made a smooth transition back into Japanese life, this has usually been at the expense of hiding or having to forget their foreign experience.

They used to be treated as unfortunates by schools and the public. Then they were bullied, coddled, discriminated against, isolated, tracked, or ignored. Yet two of them married Princes in Cinderella-like media events in the early 1990s, capturing the imagination of a nation. Others meanwhile have shot to the top of fields as diverse as finance, politics, journalism, and entertainment. Many are acting as cultural brokers on the expanding frontiers that are Japan’s relations with the rest of the world. Bilingual, bicultural
superwomen/men or cultural refugees forever tormented by the dissonance of their in-betweenness?

Once again in the limelight of public attention, the issue of Japan’s \textit{kikokusha/kikokusei/kikokushijo} seems destined for yet another transformation of image, reflecting Japan’s national identity problems and her difficulties in finding a place in the world. As a barometer of national feeling and sentiment, attitudes towards the returnees, especially as they are manifested through the educational system, are a significant reflection of what the Japanese think of the alien and the different in their midst as well as how they see themselves and their own identity in the world.

Perhaps the most controversial group of returnees are those who have had schooling in North America. It is the members of this group who have presented the most difficult and most unexpected challenges to Japan’s rigid cultural order. Their treatment suggests how conservative, conformist, and exclusive Japanese society can be in the face of pressures to internationalize. These returnees have quite literally forced a national examination of fundamentally-held values, first with regard to the educational system and recently, as many of them have begun jobs, in the work-place.

A familiar topic of discussion in Japanese society, \textit{kikokusei/kikokushijo} have been viewed alternatively as mentally-handicapped, linguistically-deprived, or culturally-stunted. The most widely-accepted educational solution has been to isolate them in special schools and classes.

One might think such students, whose parents are in the overseas vanguard of Japan’s economic success, would be regarded as an added plus in Japan’s continuing international success, yet despite rhetoric, official and otherwise, describing returnees as welcome, for most Japanese they have been an anathema, an alien phenomenon. For those returnees who are adults, the alternatives are simple: hide/down-play one’s experience (except within one’s own support groups of other returnees) or stay overseas.

Since many returnees are now young men and women assuming positions of responsibility and trust in the adult world it is clear that as an issue they will not go away for Japan. What we are seeing, in fact, is a broadening of the concept of the returnee. What is called for then is a reassessment, not only from the perspective of how Japan is affecting them, but also in terms of how they are affecting Japan and what this interchange means for Japan’s place in the world.

Returnees readily remind people in Japan of the concept seemingly on everyone’s lips: internationalization (\textit{kokusaiha}). The returnees beg the obvious question: Can Japan really
internationalize? Both *kokusaika* and *kikokushijo* are by now familiar if ambiguous themes. By looking at them together we feel some light might be shed on what have become two increasingly murky issues for Japan and its growing role in the world community.

We offer this perspective from three points of view, one as an expatriate American sociologist/anthropologist interested in the cultural phenomena associated with Japan's internationalization, another as a Japanese comparative educator and UNICEF staffer who is herself a returnee with much research experience on the long-term implications of having been a returnee, and the third as an international educator/administrator who has organized and managed large re-entry programs for returnees.

In order to understand the relationship between *kikokusei/kikokushijo/kikokusha* and *kokusaika* (returnees and internationalization), we will first attempt to understand what is meant by internationalization in Japan. Next we will reassess the background of the returnee issue, particularly noting the effect of returnees on language and cultural interaction as they become adults and move from the school into the work-place. Finally, we will offer our perspectives on the possible future course of these issues, how they reflect an evolving Japanese understanding of their own culture, their role in the world, and the need for a truly multicultural education.

**Kokusai**ka — **Internationalization**

Japan in the closing years of the 20th Century is a curious nation indeed. Although in command of immense capital and human resources, she is making her way clumsily, albeit cautiously, on the world stage. On the one hand there have been moves like the vast increase in official development assistance (ODA) to developing countries, moves which have made Japan appear to be the most generous of all developed countries.

On the other hand, product dumping, closed domestic markets, de facto support of oppressive governments, and destruction of rare natural resources in the name of ‘development’ have earned Japan such epithets as ‘environmental terrorist’ and ‘adverserial trader.’ The world’s largest donor of ODA, Japan is under fire for using programs under these auspices as a thin veil for re-circulation of Japanese money to Japanese companies building infrastructure in developing countries. This infrastructure, some argue, will enable Japanese traders to make easy market inroads.

Such practices are just the tip of an iceberg, the presence of which declares emphatically Japan’s different view of itself in the world. As events during the Gulf War
demonstrated, while Japan is an important part of the world, especially economically, it has not yet found a major role to play in the international socio-political system (if, indeed, it even wants such a role).

As both paradox and consequence we thus find in Japan an impressive and pervasive interest in *kokusaika* (internationalization), an interest which borders on a national obsession. The ongoing discussion of internationalization has elements of both xenophobia and xenophilia.

The roots of this obsession lie in what were originally very rational 19th Century fears of Western imperialism. Later, the necessity to modernize and/or westernize introduced both dissonance and dynamism into Japan’s sociocultural discourse about itself. Particularly today, as Japan is more visible on the world stage, many Japanese seem to feel that truly ‘joining with the world’ (rather than merely being ‘in the world’) would mean giving up the deep rapport they have had with their land, language, and culture. Economics may indeed motivate the rhetoric of internationalization and some of its attendant processes, but Japanese society (and in particular the Japanese educational system), has thrown up massive ramparts to protect what it views as a ‘unique’ culture and language.

*Kokusaika* is very difficult to define, having been introduced not as a formal concept but haphazardly in the mass media to describe many processes. Popular terms associated with kokusaika include *kokusaisei* (internationalness), *kokusaikan* (international sense), *kokusaiajin* (an international person), and *kokusai koryu* (international exchange). In a precise analysis, Stanford University anthropologist Harumi Befu has noted the processes associated with internationalization as follows:

1) Western Impact on Japan—internationalization as the current version of modernization (*kindaika*) or westernization (*seioka, obeika*)
2) Foreigners in Japan — a significant increase, particularly dramatic being the numbers of foreigners entering and exiting Japan
3) Liberalization of Trade Policy — internationalization of the economy
4) Japanese Investment Abroad — adaptation by Japanese to the local scene; adoption of Japanese practices by foreign businesses; training of students from developing countries
5) A Drive for Foreign Language Competence — a potent manifestation of kokusaika
6) Association with Foreigners — increasing and more forthright
7) Understanding Foreign Cultures — learning through school, the media, and
direct experience
8) Status of Foreign Faculty — their position, traditionally one of isolation and
discrimination, now gradually improving
9) Naturalization — with Japan lagging far behind other nations
10) Enhancement of Cultural Understanding of Japan — active promotion
11) Contribution to World Order — calls for Japan’s fair contribution to burden-
sharing of many kinds

Befu views the end result of these processes as very clear: nationalism (kokusuika). For him, internationalization primarily focuses on an ‘enhancement of contrast’ between Japan and the outside world. According to him this contrast is made plain to the average Japanese through...

a) foreign language instruction — the unattainable ‘other’
b) the “gaijin” syndrome — permanent outside status for foreigners
c) living abroad — usually in “Japanese ghettos”
d) Japanese language — which is said to be unique, ineffable
e) returnee childre and their re-entry problem

While we may find Befu’s conclusion that internationalization has necessarily led to a pernicious neo-nationalism (shin-kokusuika) rather extreme, it is easy to agree with him when he states that “The internationalization of Japan has brought about Japan’s identity crisis on a massive scale.”

The claim to uniqueness is an answer to this crisis, with the identity crisis for returnees thus mirrored by a generalized identity crisis for Japanese society. Many Japanese, especially those older Japanese in positions of power, are reluctant to admit that Japan has not yet fully joined the world community. At the same time they seem to privately dream of the day when Japan will be a world leader. This group pursues internationalization as one of the first lines of defense of the nation — and as a support activity for neo-nationalism.

A less hawkish view supports the sort of friendly (if rather superficial) relations engendered by short-term relationships such as ‘Sister Cities’ and student exchange programs. Yet a third view argues for a break with the past, a cross-cultural transformation towards ‘world-mindedness.’ We would summarize these three approaches just mentioned, then, as follows:
Kikokusa : Japan's Returnees

1) Internationalization as shadow defense/offense for neo-nationalism
2) Internationalization as being friendly neighbors
3) Internationalization as world-mindedness

Each of these can be seen in one form or another in the many responses to the various contexts the 'internationalization process' has created. These positions represent a wide range of sociopolitical stances taken, including regressive, conservative, liberal, experimental, regenerative, and eclectic options. What we see at one time may be any one or a combination of these options.

These views and approaches represent concurrent answers to the following important questions: Is Japan part of Asia or part of the West? Where, in fact, does Japan belong? How is Japan to view its new and evolving international role?

The last two questions are equally compelling for other countries and their educational systems, particularly the United States with its plurality of cultures. Japanese approaches to the issues generated by internationalization illuminate important options for all nations. One way of understanding these approaches and where they could possibly lead is to look at what Japan has done with her own returnees and their education.

Kikokusei/Kikokushijo – Returnees

What does the case of the returnees tell us about Japan’s attempts to join the world? How are Japan’s difficulties in ‘joining the world’ illustrated by her own returnees? First of all, what is a returnee?

Generally speaking, returnees have been defined in Japan as those persons of Japanese citizenship who have spent an extended period abroad, usually at least one or two years, and who have then returned to live in Japan. Young people have been the primary focus of research because of a) their socialization needs as Japanese and b) the institutional needs of schools for strategies for approaching these ‘special’ children. It might be noted here that the Ministry of Education’s budget for returnees is in the same fund as that for mentally handicapped children (or ‘exceptional children’ as they might be called in America). The term kikokushijo (returned boys and girls) itself reflects a certain degree of condescension, if not prejudice, and many returnees now prefer the term kikokusei (returned student).

The most extensive research into returnee problems has been done by Kobayashi
David Willis, Onoda Eriko and Walter Enloe

Tetsuya, Minoura Yasuko, Hoshino Akira, Kawabata Matsundo, Merry White, and Roger Goodman. Tokyo Gakugei University has produced excellent summary volumes of readings about returnees annually from their Tokyo Gakugei Daigaku Kaigai Shijo Kyoiku Center (1986), as has the Ministry of Education. Kobayashi, Hoshino and others started a major new research society to study returnees in the early 1980s, the Iibunkakan Kyoiku Gakkai (Association for the Study of Cross-Cultural Education). As the scholars who have worked on this issue have found, these returnees are, as international persons, both problem and potential for national cultures.

We would extend the definition of returnees beyond Japan, however. There are returnees in all cultures. This is a worldwide phenomenon, not a problem unique to Japan, something which is often forgotten in discussions about returnees in Japan. We thus deal in this essay with Japanese returnees as one representative group.

Special attention should be given to the fact that there are a variety of returnees. Where a person went, the type of education they received, the degree of acceptance they had abroad, and the degree of their integration and assimilation in joining the foreign culture all make for a kaleidoscope of individuals. Moreover, the numbers of returnees in any given situation (are there many? are there few?), their academic ability if they are students, and, perhaps most important, their class background, are all important cues for understanding specific impacts that are taking place.

For many Japanese the returnees 'way of thinking' is seen as different, not amenable to a society used to traditional conditioning. They lack "Japanese common sense." Historical, public, and research perspectives on returnees have also been very much colored by the views of particular scholars.

What is most interesting is how the chronology of returnees as a 'problem' reveals the anguished self-introspection, the on-going battle over what constitutes 'Japaneseness.' The ultimate expression, and by extension seeming resolution, of this issue can be seen in Japan's educational system; but this debate began at a very public level.

As media attention and the large sections in book stores devoted to Nihonjinron ('theories on being Japanese') attest, what really attracts the Japanese is any discussion about who they really are. The Nihonjinron literature focuses on these pseudo-scientific theories, which are really nothing more than an agenda of advocacy for cultural exceptionalism. Call it mass narcissism if you will, there is no doubt that this passion and its many interpretations have been the continual preoccupation of modern Japanese. Kikokusei/Kikokushijo are perhaps the penultimate symbol of this very public struggle for
Kikokusha: Japan's Returnees

the national soul.

As a reflection of this national identity search, it is clear that much of the attention on the issue of returnees has been media-constructed. In fact, all major research on returnees, notably the massive studies done by Kobayashi Tetsuya of Kyoto University between 1978-1990, shows that most returnees readjust rather well to Japan within a year of return. Yet there are more complex factors at work here for the returnees themselves.

From her in-depth, highly-respected longitudinal case studies of returnees from North America, psychologist Minoura Yasuko has found three patterns to returnee adaptation which reveal the complexity of returnee reactions:

1) conflicts between two cultural systems resulting in psychological strain, which forces returnees to reorganize their 'semantic space'
2) skillful manipulation of American symbols which enhance self-esteem, depending upon the context of a particular situation
3) no normative pressure or difficulties reported from the Japanese system

What we are focusing on are the sharp points of a debate generated by the first pattern described above, debates on language and cultural interaction. As one of us found in our research on returnees, the single most lasting concern...was the question of the returnee child's sense of cultural identity.

The lines of this debate delineate stark and important cultural dilemmas for Japan's future. It is the process which interests us, particularly the 'de-racination' by the education system of youngsters too young to understand themselves what is happening.

Yet it is not so much that the returnees are the issue. Rather, they are a mirror held up to society's own face. In this sense they are a necessary element in identifying boundaries which must be preserved, much as a criminal or other deviant tells us by his transgression what is normative and what is not. Professor Merry White of Boston University puts it another way: "The returnee symbolizes transgression and thereby represents a sort of photographic negative of the Japanese ideal." As she notes, "...negative models preserve homogeneity more than idealized persons or heroic figures."

Many Japanese complain that as a people they lack 'international sense', and indeed there is clearly a lack of acceptance of plurality. It is almost as if we are viewing a society still consciously drawing the line between what is civilized and what is barbarian. Two famous proverbs speak for this: "Treat a stranger like a thief," and "The stake that sticks
out gets hammered down.” Until fairly recently, even students transferring to a different high school in the same city found life unbearable, being treated as “outsiders” (gaibu or yosomonono). Reprehensible Japanese behavior overseas, whether by conquering armies in World War II or by modern tourists, has been attributed to traditional concepts of how to react to anything strange and different. The problem of returnees has brought such concepts into sharp focus.

Evolution of An Image: The Returnee Phenomenon as Social Mirror

A chronological treatment of the development of the returnee issue reflects Japanese strategies for dealing with ‘alien’ phenomena. First, returnees were in fact not even ‘seen.’ They were a Non-Phenomenon until the early 1970s, despite the fact that there have been ‘returnees’ throughout Japanese history. The most significant group is not this recent wave of young people, but the millions who returned from Japan’s failed overseas colonies after World War II. Indeed, returnees as we see them today are largely a construction of key ‘social commentators’ and the media.

The transition to a visible phenomenon began as the numbers of young returnees became too difficult to ignore, especially for schools. We would call this next period The Handicap Stage, notably in terms of returnee roles in education, jobs and the home.15 During the 1970s certain factors, such as returnees being placed in mentally handicapped classes and the active disapproval of relatives towards the idea of sending children overseas, distinguish the emergence of returnees as a public phenomenon.

The next major step, from the late 1970s through the mid 1980s, is the conferral on returnees of Minority Status, and with that status an accompanying social discrimination. Returnees are seen as deprived, especially in their lack of knowledge of Japanese. The government subsequently reacts with provisions such as special language instruction at home and abroad. Japanese schools overseas, both full-time and so-called ‘Saturday schools,’ are responses. At this point we see an especially intense media coverage of the abuses of returnees.16

Next we see the recognition by some people of returnees as having Special Status, as being separate but not equal. Still the most commonly-held view, at this stage returnees are seen as a social problem, not a linguistic one. Their lives are complicated by competing cultural loyalties. The returnees’ contribution to the discourse on ‘cultural dissonance’ combined with an overemphasis on their problems reflects the traditional self-critical view
Japanese have of themselves. Returnees themselves enter this discourse, particularly with
the radical views of the returnee Horoiwa Naomi, who sees returnees as a new type of
human who 'grafts on' their foreign experience rather than 'shaving it off.'

From the mid-1980s, however, media fatigue sets in, and, with this lack of interest,
public indifference to the phenomenon. Moreover, the range of types of returnees
broadens, making a clear focus more difficult. There are other more important social
problems to attend to such as group bullying in schools (ijime) and the rising number of
children of foreign laborers in the schools. Returnees thus move from being a major issue
to being a Non-Issue.

Then in the late 1980s returnees re-emerge as a Special Attraction, as privileged people
whose services are in special demand as they enter the work force. Newspaper advertise-
ments can be seen specifically looking for returnees. One Japan Airlines-affiliated
travel company even began to hire only returnees from this time.

In an analysis of this change, the Nihon Keizai Shinbun in the late 1980s reported
companies specifically recruiting returnees, whose 'wide views and strong personalities'
were thought to help the companies compete better. Some companies began conducting
recruiting trips to the U.S. at this time, looking for 'excellent possible employees'
(meaning Japanese educated abroad), a practice which continues. This has spurred a
corresponding increase in young Japanese going to the US for a year or two of education,
in hopes of easier entrance to top universities, and/or later being recruited to a higher
position back home than for which they normally would have been qualified. One sign of
this was seen in 1989, when Japanese students registered by far the highest percentage
jump among foreign students studying in American universities (to nearly 30,000), third
in total behind only China and Taiwan.

This change from status to that of a literal 'dream goal' (akogare no mato) for young
Japanese is the latest development in the returnee phenomenon. Significantly, it is also a
route that circumvents the traditional rigors of the examination system. Returnees are
now seen as potential catalysts for Japanese society. They have moved from being pitied
as incompetents to being admired as having special competences. Biculturalism and
bilingualism are beginning to be seen as desirable, marketable skills.

Moreover, the variety of companies who want such people has increased. Limited
before to the international sections of trading firms, banks, and overseas manufacturers,
they can now be found in many departments of a wide range of companies. Their different
ways of thinking, especially as they impart fresh new ideas, are increasingly seen as more
important than language ability alone.

Finally, in the late 1980s we see a shift away from returnees per se as an issue and towards what might more appropriately be called Questions of Japanese Identity, with a focus on the problems of the active re-organization of cultural identity. Attention has thus moved away from the 'victim' and more towards society itself. For some commentators returnees are now seen as models to be emulated, as truly transnational or transcultural people. This last stage represents the ultimate cooptation of the issue of the returnees as they are re-integrated into Japanese society at an elite level.

Returnees and the Japanese Educational System

The first important shift in consciousness in the educational system can be traced to the late 1970s when returnees ceased being viewed as handicapped and started being given a special status. Kunio Sato, then-director of Mombusho's Office of Overseas Schools, pointed out this shift to us in an interview concerning the nature of the returnee dilemma as it applies to the Japanese educational system:

"We used to have a problem with them not knowing Japanese, but that is much improved. Now the real difficulty, especially for the sons and daughters of the elite, is their reaction to the severity of the school culture back in Japan. Many of these students are alienated and the answer they get is if they object they should stop being Japanese. Gradually the society's attitude may change, but right now the conflict of value system is clear. And it is the parents' responsibility, hence their demand for more Japanese education overseas."

This perceptual shift was accompanied by most school teachers and students back home responding to returnees by treating them as "infected with foreignness" (gaikoku kabure). In most cases, strong efforts were made to strip them of this foreignness, to 'Japanize' them, a process said to take from two to four years. The easiest age to readapt is said to be up to eight and the hardest from eight to fifteen. But it is teachers who have had to directly confront this 'problem.'

In a survey of teachers of returnees in the early 1980s, Tokyo psychologist Hoshino Akira found these descriptions repeated again and again: smart-aleck, weird, pushy, too talkative, too assertive, disobedient, uncooperative and restless. Perhaps, as Hoshino has pointed out, the real problem is that Japanese are afraid of being internationalized too
The unspoken sentiment that too much “foreignness” will change the alleged purity of the race and the character of national politics is a strong one. Americanized children seem to face the most difficulty. Their individualistic manner disrupts normal social patterns and is labelled “arrogance” by many Japanese.

Then, in the mid-1980s, another shift began, as we have mentioned. Kobayashi has stated that this represents a significant change in approach, signaled by “phenomenal changes in policies and practices.” He pointedly notes the change of terminology: “from adjustment of ‘problem children’ to nourishment of ‘international children’.”

Returnees of course question the entire rationale of the Japanese system of national social bonding through a uniform education by a) not speaking the standard language and b) avoiding the grueling examination system. The most recent response, as we have seen, has been to treat them as an elite, with the ultimate goal of assimilation at a high level of the hierarchy. Roger Goodman of Oxford University, who spent a year studying one of the elite schools founded for returnees, has even put forward the startling thesis that what is happening represents the ‘emergence of a new class.’

The most dramatic evidence to suggest a change in the way returnees are regarded came with the 1990 and 1993 marriages of commoners to the two Princes directly in line to be Emperor. The first example, Kawashima Kiko (or ‘Kiko-san’ as the press affectionately dubbed her) is the daughter of an economics professor, a returnee who spent part of her primary and middle school years in America and Austria.

As the Asahi Shimbun editorialized the day after Kiko-san’s engagement announcement, “In the hope of allowing her to move beyond the confines of nationality, unprejudiced by race or sex, her parents sent her to local schools. In her home the expression ‘think for yourself’ is often heard. Her friends describe her as a true internationalist, with a calm and cheerful personality, combined with an impish sense of humor.” The second and more dramatic example was Owada Masako, a career diplomat in the foreign service whose diplomatic and linguistic skills (not to mention having lived many years overseas) clearly qualify her as a transnational person. For returnees themselves, the cases of Kiko-san and Masako-sama represent a welcome change of attitude by Japanese society.

Although the new Princesses have received the most media attention for their ‘internationalness,’ it should be mentioned that the present Emperor and his family are all cosmopolitans. The Emperor himself had a Quaker American tutor after the war, speaks fluent English, was the first crown prince to marry a commoner, and has actively supported the education abroad of all of his children. The deep symbolism associated with the
Emperor for the Japanese people cannot be understated. Thus, the fact of having a cosmopolitan leader as a role model will likely have an increasingly positive impact on Japan.

Questions of Identity

What effect does a returnee experience have on a person's cultural or ethnic identity over the long-term? In the first research conducted on these long-term effects, one of us conducted 46 extensive interviews with returnees aged 18-29 who had more than two years experience abroad. Like the elements of ethnic minority identity described for Blacks and others in the West, there appear to be four stages.

First is a denial of the minority status, then a meeting of novels and experiences that positively inform one about the experience, followed by a change in consciousness towards valuing that status, and finally a wider concern about the social situation not only of one's own group but of other groups, too.

For returnees, at the first stage of denial there are two types: 1) one who denies the foreign cultural experience and idealizes Japan and 2) one who denies Japan and idealizes the foreign experience. One example at this stage was a young woman who hated America, kept the experience secret, and yet was thought to be a 'half' (a term for mixed children) because of her difficulty in keeping up in school. Another was a man born overseas who hid his inability to use chopsticks by always eating onigiri for his school lunch (riceballs wrapped in seaweed, which can be eaten with one's hands).

On the other hand are those returnees like the woman who idealized Canada and didn't like other Japanese or anything Japanese. For her, 'everything in Japan became so stupid.' Refusing to change herself, she said she enjoyed talking English in the bus with her sister, While these two types may appear to be opposites, they are in fact the same. Both identify 'true' culture as belonging to only one 'better' culture. There is no allowance made for an experience which integrates two or more cultures.

At the second stage are those returnees like the one who 'changed her mind... was proud to be a returnee' when she entered a company and had the benefits of her extolled to her by others. When other people value returnees for their ability at languages or understanding of other cultures the returnees themselves may change their minds about the meaning of their experience. Moreover, when returnees meet other returnees or travel to other countries they often realize that the influence of foreign life was stronger than they had thought. Many become even more aware of being Japanese.
In the third stage returnees formulate their own identity based on their own cultural experience. As one said, "Now I feel I'm Japanese. I've been to four countries, but now I feel I'm Japanese at the bottom of my heart." On the surface, it appears that most returnees choose one of two approaches for living with their returnee experience in Japan, either hiding it and blending in or using it as a selling point for themselves in their careers. Few, however, inwardly choose one culture. Most can't decide which is better and continue to worry and be troubled about which is superior or better. One of the interviewees said she was not proud of being a Japanese, but of being an 'Americanized Japanese.' She neither denies nor dislikes her Japanese identity, but wants 'to pick up the good things of Japan and America.' On close examination over half those interviewed have a clear progression through these three stages.

The next important step in the formation of cultural identity is returnees who realize they don't have to choose between countries or cultures. In addition, there is a growing awareness that the influence of different cultural experiences naturally changes as time goes on, as well as the danger of over-estimating the influence of the experience with another culture.

Clearly, the returnee issue is a fluid one. It is also an important reflection of Japan's larger society coming to terms with questions of cultural identity.

Language

A few comments on language are in order given the key role it plays in returnees' own self-image. First, returnees who have chosen an international path, eschewing the Nihonjin ghettos overseas, have learned to use at least two languages in two settings, abroad and at home. A Japanese prescription that they invariably violate is that of operating solely in a single standardized language (hyojungo, said to be standard Japanese). This standard language has been a necessary basis for expanding and delimiting Japan's national boundaries and for communication within the national group. It was a signal element in Japan's former imperial expansion.25

Today the bonding experience provided by this language, while not on an imperial track, does provide graduates from the rigorous examination system the feeling that they belong to one another, a feeling not far different from that of military drill and the psychological residue such drill leaves behind.26 The exam system is therefore a very effective tool for national unification and will not be abandoned.
The returnee experience, however, questions the entire rationale of this system. The most recent response, as we have seen, has been to treat them as an elite, with the ultimate goal of assimilation at a high level of the hierarchy. The special status schools founded for them have such an elite purpose.

Kobayashi and others have found an inverse relation between length of time spent overseas and ability to reassimilate, mainly drawing on evidence of language skills. As he states,

"In the early days, it was not uncommon to see returning children treated as sub-normal children because of their Japanese language deficiency. Some were put in the special classes with mentally handicapped children or in classes one or two grades lower than those appropriate for their ages. Nowadays, such cases may no longer exist, but the necessity for providing them supplementary or remedial Japanese instruction still remains."28

These remedial programs even extend to English, because the teaching of English in Japan emphasizes the grammar translation method, and without an adequate knowledge of Japanese a student can do poorly even after having mastered oral communication in English. The status of foreign languages in Japan, especially of English, is also curious. English is a required subject for the three years of compulsory middle school, and is required also in the three years of noncompulsory high school (which 95% of Japanese youths attend). Of the nearly 50% of high school graduates who move on to higher education, many take even more classes in English.

Typically, English Language and Literature is one of the largest major courses of study at the undergraduate level in college, and the English Speaking Society of each campus is usually one of the largest and most active of student organizations. Yet the overwhelming emphasis in English instruction, especially in middle and high school, is on grammar and mechanics, not on communication. Japanese have a high comprehension of written English, but as anyone who was had contact with them can attest their conversational ability is surprisingly weak.

It is as though the traditional ideal of wakon-yosai ("Japanese spirit, western knowledge"), which served as a guide for the modernization push of the Meiji era, has been transmitted intact to the present. Being able to read a foreign language allows the Japanese to gain access to foreign knowledge, while being discouraged from learning to speak prevents a Japanese from becoming "corrupted" through too much direct contact
Kikokusha: Japan's Returnees

with "outsiders" (gaijin, in Japanese). In effect, the study of English in Japan is much like
what the study of Latin was for the West in the early modern period. It is a sign of status,
a certification that one is truly qualified to serve in the elite. Moreover, it allows one access
to valuable knowledge which to the layman exists only in an arcane and forbidding form.
The difference, of course, is that Latin was already a dead language; English is not.

This is ironic given the intensive, seemingly pervasive study of English. Japan
probably has more private English language schools for children and adults, per capita,
than any other country in the world. As an English professor at a national university once
remarked to us, "Japanese adults, especially college graduates, are so embarrassed that
they can't speak simple English after so many years of study that learning English is a
preoccupation for many to improve themselves."

With so much effort and involvement manifested within Japan for mastering English,
one would think that the returnee children, who in fact do achieve fluency quite often
during the period of their sojourn, would be esteemed by society. Yet as often as not, the
returnee child finds it expedient to hide his or her second language competence. One 13-
year-old girl told us that she hid her English ability from her teacher until her parents met
with the teacher to discuss her grades. She said, "I didn't want anyone to know I spoke
English well. Everyone would just think I was trying to show off. So when the teacher
would say, "Thizu is an aparu" (apple), I would say the same thing. It was a big joke."

Sadly, the joke reflects more than the naivete of a student trying to imitate her
teacher's incomprehensible oral English. The possibilities for further growth which these
returnees could make in English are often dampened, and the motivation to do one's best
is, more often than not, extinguished, simply because what they have already accom-
plished is not supported.

Several reasons are often given by teachers for this situation: that teachers don't have
enough time to set up a course of study for bilingual returnees, particularly when there
may be only one or two in a school, or that the teachers of English are embarrassed that
while they may read and write English well, they cannot carry on a simple, intelligible
conversation. There is also the fact that, given the essentially egalitarian orientation of
schools (where there are no ability groupings), there are no special resource teachers to
provide advanced instruction in English.

Support or hindrance of returnees varies from teacher to teacher, of course, and we
have found examples of both the teacher who spends extra time with a returnee or pro-
vides extra assignments and encouragement, and the teacher who either neglects the child
David Willis, Onoda Eriko and Walter Enloe

or taunts them with remarks like, “Americajin, forget your English. You’re behind in Japanese, and that’s all that matters.”

Why would the returnees be penalized for their English competence and foreign experience, at least as often as they are praised for it? As we have suggested, the attitude of the Japanese toward foreign experience is a complex one. At one and the same time, Japan is intimately involved with the world community in trade and technology transfer, yet in many ways still manifests shimaguni konjo, an insular mentality. For many Japanese, it is the Japanese language itself that has come to harbor the national essence, the essential claim of absolute uniqueness. Many Japanese believe that their language is exceptionally difficult in comparison with all other languages. Some even say that it possesses a spirit or soul that sets it apart from all other languages. Others believe that it makes possible a superior supralinguistic or nonverbal communication not enjoyed by any other society. In sum, the Japanese language is viewed as the repository of the national identity. Therefore, to learn a second and competing language to a stage of fluency endangers that identity.

Returnees and Internationalization — Prospects

Most Japanese assume as axiomatic that the geographic isolation and supposed racial homogeneity of Japan make it a unique culture. Certainly in one sense this is true: all cultures are unique. But implicit in the Japanese notion of culture is the belief that their culture is uniquely advanced, uniquely homogeneous. It therefore can be completely understood only by those who participate totally within it. It goes without saying that no foreigner, no matter how many years resident within Japan or how fluent his/her Japanese, could possibly have the sensibility and empathic understanding for life in Japan that a native will have. To suggest that such might be possible is an insult to the Japanese self-concept.

By extension, any Japanese who becomes too familiar with foreign cultures — either through living in them or having extensive contact with foreigners — is thought to be in danger of having lost, in some sense, his/her ‘purity’ as a Japanese. Such is clearly the case for the returnees.

Much of contemporary internationalization in Japan is also apparently only “import-oriented,” the main idea being that Japan has to change its culture to accommodate others. That Japanese culture may have something worthy and capable of export besides certain antique performing arts seems unthinkable. Returnees, on the other hand, act as
a bridge, not only bringing foreign culture home but transmitting contemporary Japanese culture abroad.\(^{29}\)

Whether internationalization in Japan leads more frequently to a reassertion of nationalism than toward a more cosmopolitan perspective is thus an open question. In the past, exposure to the new and alien has often promoted a renewed identification with the family of the Japanese nation instead of the family of humanity. Instead of freeing Japanese from local attachments (to Japan) and prejudices against foreigners at home or abroad, for some Japanese the experience of getting to know foreigners at home and in foreign countries seems to renew their attachment to Japan and even awaken formerly dormant prejudices against locals or foreigners (such as Southeast Asians). In this sense, rather than leading directly to a cosmopolitan world view, internationalization, at least for some Japanese, leads to its opposite, to a renewed nationalism.

A large part of the problem is of course the traditional Japanese suspicion of anything strange or different. Despite Japanese presumptions about the purity of their race, and foreign readiness to embrace this stereotype, Japan is in fact a multicultural society composed of numerous ‘clans’ based on geographical or social association. Friction between these groups is well-documented. The difficulties between Kantōjin and Kansaijin (people of the Tokyo and Osaka areas), for instance, along with the plight of minorities, are only thinly veiled by the highly vocal emphasis on homogeneity, a concept some researchers call “an intellectual fraud.” The Japanese have in fact historically accentuated differences rather than similarities in their population.

This accent of differences highlights the need for standardization of the social system, which is seen as the basis of the economic strength of Japan and thus its security and independence. Here we touch on Japanese values in comparative perspective. The Dutch sociologist Geert Hofstede has revealed why kikokusei/kikokushijo are out of place for the Japanese, assembling some impressive data on national values\(^ {30}\) which he groups around the way cultures relate to four basic cultural concepts.

These basic cultural concepts, along with Japan’s and America’s positions as examples on a scale of 100, are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cultural Concept</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power distance/ relation to authority</td>
<td>Japan 54, US 40, Mean 52, SD 20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertainty avoidance</td>
<td>Japan 92, US 46, Mean 64, SD 24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individualism</td>
<td>Japan 46, US 91, Mean 50, SD 25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Masculinity  
(Japan 95, US 62, Mean 50, SD 20)

Returnees, we note, have different approaches to these basic questions when compared with typical Japanese. By contrast, they...challenge authority, have learnt to deal effectively with uncertainty, are individuals, and tend to be more aware of gender equality and gender contributions. Moreover, many of the most vocal returnees are women, a direct challenge to a highly masculine society.

If we note means and standard deviations above, Japan is clearly different from other nations in uncertainty avoidance and masculinity, whereas the US (often a model for returnees) stands out on individuality. This suggests that Japan needs to adopt mechanisms for flexibility and dealing with uncertainty (both strong suits of returnees), not to mention the value of feminine contributions to society. Returnees on the other hand should try to be less individualistic, at least while they are in Japan.

What is most significant here, is that internationalization for Japan requires change not only in its national economy, organizations, and in the individual, but at what the American scholar Herbert Passin calls ‘the level of very basic cultural values.’

One of the most impressive principles of internationalism is, conversely, that one should first know and appreciate those whom one is closest to, both physically and socially. The treatment of women, for instance, grossly ignored and undervalued in many societies, runs counter not only to the principles of internationalism but is a waste of a valuable human resource. This is likewise true of minorities. In Japan, the ‘invisibility’ of women together with minority communities such as Koreans, Burakumin, and Chinese, erodes attempts to relate internationally. Respect for and acknowledgement of the dignity and possible contributions of these groups (in other words, making the invisible visible) is a necessary component of any true internationalization.

As for returnees, there is a growing awareness of what Princeton University scholar Richard Falk has called ‘the formation of a global constituency of persons who complement their national citizenship with identities as planetary citizens.’ These people demonstrate an expansion of the concepts of identity and loyalty that are critical if we wish to see the transition to a humane world system. International people like returnees embody in thought, feeling, and action what is needed to transform the present system. Multiple identity patterns are thus very important, beginning with a planetary identity and including national, class, ethnic, religious, local, and family identities. Each should be vivid and intense.
In the context of an increasingly interdependent world the Japanese may find the path of undifferentiated national character and culture a difficult one to follow. The returnees symbolize not only Japan's success abroad but an unsettling confrontation to a domestic order uncomprehending of anything less than total obedience and conformity. Although children have been the primary focus of this dilemma, their parents face similar difficulties in their work places and neighborhoods when they return. That many of these families are the educated managerial elite means increasing attention to a phenomenon which reflects an evolving Japanese consciousness about their own nationality and place in the world.

If we want to understand returnees we should thus look at them through the lens of a larger cultural perspective, not merely as aberrant or deviant sociological subjects. One problem with Japanese society, as well as with many of the researchers/commentators on this phenomenon, is a focus which seems so often to be on differences. Perhaps it is time now to focus on the similarities. Returnees can be seen as catalysts in viewing these similarities, how we are all rather more similar than most people, especially most Japanese, realize. Returnees make us all think of the larger picture, of the meaning of Japanese education and culture — and of other national systems of education and their cultures. The returnee experience, as a common one for all cultures, holds promise for a world increasingly interlinked and interdependent.

The authors would like to thank Soai University for various research grants which have supported this research, especially the Special Grant for Research in Summer 1993. We would also like to express our appreciation to Professors Minoura Yasuko, Kobayashi Tetsuya, Hoshino Akira, Ebuchi Kazukimi, Ehara Takekazu, and Suzuki Masayuki for sharing their scholarship and humanity with us.

Footnotes


2) One group, however, has had the questionable ‘benefit’ of an encapsulated Japanese experience overseas. These are the returnees who attended Japanese schools abroad (many in developing countries), generally following a compound life-style which afforded them little contact with the local culture beyond servants and shopping. Not surprisingly, for these people there have been few readjustment problems to Japan.

David Willis, Onoda Eriko and Walter Enloe


5 ) Ibid., p. 259.

7) See, for example, Tokyo Daigaku Kaigai Shijo Kyoiku Center, 1986. Perhaps the most active member of this group is Nishimura Shunichi, whose outspokenness has generated a useful counterpoint to the mainstream researchers mentioned above.


9) This very active society, with annual meetings of 300-400 people, has broadened its research scope to include issues concerning overseas students in Japan and other themes related to internationalization.


15) An early official review of education for returnees can be found in Kaigaishijo Kyōiku Shinkouzaidan, *Kaigaishijo Kyōiku Shinkouzaidan Junenshi* (Japan Overseas Educational Services, Ten Years of JOES, 1980). That returnees were actually suffering from a psychological afflication or 'disease' was an idea explored by a group of researchers around Inamura Hiroshi at Tsukuba University. See Inamura Hiroshi, *Nihonjin no Kaigai Futekio* [Japanese Maladjustment Abroad], (Tokyo NHK Bukkanju, 1980) and Inamura, Hiroshi, Kaigai Zaijūu kara Kikoku Shita Hoojin Oyobi Zainichi Gaikkōkujin no Futekio Genshoo to Sonō Taisaku ni Kansuru Kenkyū [Research on Maladjustment Phenomenon of Returned Japanese and Foreign Sojourners in Japan and Its Countermeasures], (Ibaragi: Tsukuba University, 1984). A more sympathetic, popularized view of returnees was published by the Asahi Evening News as *Chiisana Kokusaijin* (Little International Persons), (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1978).


18) *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, “Damen 87: Kokusaika Moteru Kikokushijo: Hiroi Shiiya, Tsuyoi
Kileoleusha: Japan's Returnees

Koosei Chuumoku; Kyuuzzo Suru Yobi Gun (The Demand for Internationally-Experienced Japanese: Wide Views and Strong Personalities; Increasing Numbers of Students; Increasing Schools Accepting Such Students)," September 6, 1987, p. 9.

19) Ibid.
20) From a personal interview with Professor Hoshino.
29) Japanese find this way of thinking hard to believe and must be told by authorities outside Japan (especially Japanese who have been accepted by the Western power structure) that this is so. Professor Emeritus Heisuke Hironaka of Harvard University is one example. He has noted that Japan has more in the way of ‘cultural systems management’ that is exportable than is normally thought. Hironaka Heisuke, “Iibunka ni Fure Aratana Hiyaku (Progress Through Cross-Cultural Contact),” Yomiuri Shimbun July 22, 1987, p. 8.
32) Falk, The End of World Order (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1983), p. 58. See also recent
research by Nakajima Satoko (1991), Kikokushijo no Iibunka Taiken no Chokiteki Eikyo (The
Long-Term Effects of Returnees' Intercultural Experience), (B.A. thesis, Kyoto University
Faculty of Education, 1991). A provocative new look at the human acquisition of cultural sys-
tems which may address some of the key questions raised in this essay can be found in Minoura
Yasuko, “A Sensitive Period for the Incorporation of a Cultural Meaning System: A Study of
339, and Minoura Yasuko, “Culture and Personality Reconsidered: Theory Building from Cases
of Japanese Children Returning from the United States,” The Quarterly Newsletter of the